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EX PARTE: IN THE MATTER OF AUGUST SPIES AIND OTHERS.
Application for the allowance of a writ of error to the Supreme Court of
the State of Illinois.

M . CHIEF JUSTICE WArE delivered the opinion of the
court.
When, as in this case, application is made to us on the suggestion of one of our number, to whom a similar application had
been previously addressed, for the allowance of a writ of error
to the highest court of a State under § 709 of the Revised Statutes, it is our duty to ascertain not only whether any question
reviewable here was made and decided in the proper court below, but whether it is of a character to justify us in bringing
the judgment here for re-examination. In our opinion the writ
ought not to be allowed by the c6urt, if it appears from the face
of the record that the decision of the Federal question which is
complained of was so plainly right as not to require argument,
and especially if it is in accordance with our own well-considered judgments in similar cases. That is in effect what was
done in Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321, where the
writ was refused, because the questions presented by the record
were "no longer subjects of discussion here," although if they
had been, in the opinion of the court, "open," it would have
been allowed. When, under § 5 of our Rule 6, a motion to
affirm is united with a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, the practice has been to grant the motion to affirm when
"the question on which our jurisdiction depends was so manifestly decided right that the case ought not to be held for further
argument": Arrowsmith v. Harmoning, 118 U. S. 194, 195;
Church v. Kesey, 121 Id. 282. The propriety of adopting
a similar rule upon motions in open court for the allowance of
a writ of error is apparent, for certainly we would not be justified as a court in sending out a writ to bring up for review a
judgment of the highest court of a State, when it is apparent on
the face of the record that our duty would be to grant a motion
to affirm as soon as it was made in proper form.
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In the present case we have had the benefit of argument in
support of the application, and while counsel have not deemed
it their duty to go fully into the merits of the Federal questions
they suggest, they have shown us distinctly what the decisions
were of which they complain, and how the questions arose. In
this way we are able to determine as a court in session whether
the errors alleged are such as to justify us in bringing the case
here for review.
*We proceed, then, to consider what the questions are on which,
if it exists at all, our j urisiliction depends. They are thus stated
in the opening brief of counsel for petitioners :
"First. Petitioners challenged the validity of the statute of
Illinois, under and pursuant to which the trial jury was selected
and empanelled, on the ground of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States, and the State court sustained the validity of the statute.
"Second. Petitioners asserted and claimed, under the Constitution of the United States, the right, privilege, and immunity of trial by an impartial jury, and the decision of the State
court was against the right, privilege, and immunity so asserted
and claimed.
"Third. The State of Illinois made, and the State court enforced against petitioners, a law (the aforesaid statute) whereby
the privileges and immunities of petitioners, as citizens of the
United States, were abridged, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
"Fourth. Upon their trial for a capital offence, petitioners
were compelled by the State court to be witnesses against themselves, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States, which declare that ' no person shall be -ompelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,' and that
'no person shall be deprived of life or liberty without due
process of law.'
"Fifth. That by the action of the State court in said trial
petitioners were denied ' the equal protection of the laws,' contrary to the guaranty of the said Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.'
The particular provisions of the Constitution of the United
States on which counsel rely are found in Articles IV, V, VI,
and XIV of the Amendments6 as follows:
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Art. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated."
Att. V. "No person * * * shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Art. VI. " In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law."
Art. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States ; nor shall any State deprive any 'person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
That the first ten Articles of Amendment were not intended
to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their
own people, but to operate on the National Government alone,
was decided more than a half century ago, and that dccision has
been steadily adhered to since: Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters
243, 247; Livingston v. Moore, Id. 469, 552; Fox v. Ohio, 5
How. 410, 434; Smith v. Maryland, 18 Id. 71, 76 ; Mithers
v. Buckley, 20 Id. 84, 91 ; Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5
Wall. 475, 479; Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 7 Id. 321,
325; The Justices v. .furray, 9 Id. 274, 278; Edwards v.
Elliott, 21 Id. 532, 557; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S.90;
United States v. (,ruikshank, 92 Id. 542, 552; Pearson v.
Yewdall, 95 Id. 294, 296 ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 Id.
97, 101; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S.79; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S.252, 265.
It was contended, however, in argument that, "1though originally the first ten amendments were adopted as limitations on
Federal power, yet in so far as they secure and recognize fundamental rights-common-law rights-of the man, they make
them privileges and immunities of the man as a citizen of the
United States, and cannot now be abridged by a State under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, while the ten amendments as limitations on power only apply to the Federal Government, and not to the States, yet in so far as they declare or
VOL. XXXVI.-4
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recognize rights of persons, these rights are theirs, as citizens of
the United States, and the Fourteenth Amendment as to such
rights limits State power, as the ten amendments had limited
Federal power."
It is also contended that the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which declares that no State shall deprive "any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,"
implies that every person charged with crime in a State shall be
entitled to a trial by an impartial jury, and shall not be compelled to testify against himself.
The objections are in brief, 1, that a statute of the State as
construed by the court deprived the petitioners of an impartial
jury; and, 2, that Spies was compelled to give evidence against
himself. Before considering whether the Constitution of the
United States has the effect which is claimed, it is proper to inquire whether the Federal questionsrelied on in fact do arise on
the face of this record.
The statute to which objection is made was approved March
12, 1874, and has been in force since July 1 of that year.
Hurd's Rev. Stat. Ill., 1885, p. 752, c. 78, § 14. It is as follows :
"It shall be sufficient cause of challenge of a petit juror that
he lacks any one of the qualifications mentioned in section 2 of
this act; or if he is not one of the regular panel, that he has
served as a juror on the trial of a cause in any court of record
in the county within one year previous to the time of his being
offered as a juror; or, that he is a party to a suit pending for
trial in that court at that term. It shall be the duty of the
court to discharge from the panel all jurors who do not possess
the qualifications provided in this act, as soon as the fact is discovered: Provided, if a person has served on a jury in a court
of record within one year, lie shall be exempt from again serving during such year, unless he waives such exemption : Providedfurther, that it shall not be a cause of challenge that a
juror has read in the newspapers an account of the commission of
the crime with which the prisoner is charged, if such juror
shall state on oath that he believes he can render an impartial
verdict according to the law and the evidence: and provided
further, that in the trial of any criminal cause, the fact that a
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person called as a juror has formed an opinion or impression,
based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements (about the
truth of which he has expressed no opinion), shall not disqualify him to serve as a juror in such case, if he shall upon
oath state that he believes he can fairly and impartially render a
verdict therein in accordance with the law and the evidence, and
the court shall be satisfied of the truth of such statement."
The complaint is that the trial court, acting under this statute
and in accordance with its requirements, compelled the petitioners
against their will to submit to a trial by a jury that was not impartial, and thus deprived them of one of the fundamental
rights which they had as citizens of the United States under
the National Constitution, and if the sentence of the court is
carried into execution they will be deprived of their lives without due process of law.
In Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, it was decided by this court
that when "a challenge by a defendant in a criminal action to
a juror, for bias, actual or implied, is disallowed, and the juror
is thereupon peremptorily challenged by the defendant and excused, and an impartial and competent juror is obtained in his
place, no inju - is done the defendant, if until the jury is completed he has ther peremptory challenges which lie can use."
And so in Hay, v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 71, it was said: "The
right to challenge the right to reject, not to select a juror. If
from those who rem,'in an impartial jury is obtained, the constitutional right of th, accused is maintained." Of the correctness of these rulings we entertain no doubt.
We are, therefore, confined in this case to the rulings on the
challenges to the jurors who actually sat at the trial. Of these
there were but two-Theodore Denker, the third juror who was
sworn, and H. T. Sanford, the last, who was called and sworn
after all the peremptory challenges of the defendants had been
exhausted.
At the trial, the court construed the statute to mean, that,
"although a person called as a juryman may have formed an
opinion based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements, but
has expressed no opinion as to the truth of the newspaper statement, he is still qualified as a juror if he states that he can fairly
and impartially render a verdict thereon in accordance with the
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law and the evidence, and the court shall be satisfied of the truth
of such statement. It is not a test question the juror will have
the opinion which lie has formed from newspapers changed by
the evidence, but whether his verdict will be based only upon
the account which may here be given by witnesses under oath."
Interpreted in this way, the statute is not materially different
from that of the Territory of Utah, which we had under consideration in Hopt v. Utah, ubi supra, and to which we then
gave effect. As that was a territorial statute, passed by a territorial legislature for the government of a territory over which
the United States had exclusive jurisdiction, it came directly
within the operation of art. 6 of the Amendments, which guaranteed to Hopt a trial by an impartial jury: Webster v. Reid,
11 How. 437, 459. No one at that time suggested a doubt of
the constitutionality of the statute, and it was regarded, both in
the territorial courts and here, as furnishing the proper rule to
be observed by a territorial court in empanelling an impartial
jury in a criminal case.
A similar statute was enacted in New York, May 3, 1872
(Acts of 1872, c. 475, 9 N. Y. Stat. at Large, 2d ed., 373); in
Michigan, April 18, 1873 (Acts of 1873, 165, Art. 117; Howell's Stat., § 9,564); in Nebraska (Comp. Stat. Neb. 1885, p.
838; Criminal Code, § 468); and in Ohio (Rev. Stat. Ohio,
1880, § 7,278). The constitutionality of the statute of New
York was sustained by the Court of Appeals of that State in
Stokes v. Tze People, 53 N. Y. 164, 172, decided June 10, 1873,
and that of Ohio, in Cooper v. State, 16 Ohio St. 328. So far
as we have been able to discover, no doubt has ever been entertained in Michigan or Nebraska of the constitutionality of the
statutes of those States respectively, but they have always been
treated by their Supreme Court as valid, both under the Constitution of the United States, and under that of the State:
Stephens v. The People, 38 Mich. 739, 741; Ulrich v. The People,
30 Mich. 245; .urphy v. The State, 15 Neb. 383.
Indeed, the rule of the statute of Illinois as it was construed
by the trial court is not materially different from that which
has been adopted by the courts in many of the States without
legislative action: Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295;
Holt v. The People, 13 Mich. 224; State v. Fox, 1 Dutch. 566;
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Oslander v. The Commonwealth, 3 Leigh 780; State v. Mlington, 7 Iredell 61 ; Smith v. .mes, 3 Scam. 81. See also an
elaborate note to this last case in 36 Am. Dec. 521, where a
very large number of authorities on the subject are cited.
Without pursuing this subject further, it is sufficient to say
that we agree entirely with the Supreme Court of Illinois in its
opinion in this case, that the statute on its face, as construed by
the trial court, is not repugnant to § 9 of Art. 2 of the Constitution of that State, which guarantees to the accused party in
every criminal prosecution "a speedy trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district in which the offence is alleged to have
been committed." As this is substantially the provision of the
Constitution of the United States on which the petitioners now
rely, it follows that, even if their position as to the operation
and effect of that Constitution is correct, the statute is not open
to the objection which is made against it.
We proceed, then, to a consideration of the grounds of challenge to the jurors Denker and Sanford, to see if in the actual
administration of the rule of the statute by the court, the rights
of the defendants under the Constitution of the United States
were in any way impaired or violated.
Denker was examined by the counsel for the defendants when
he was called as a juror, and, after stating his name and place
of residence, proceeded as follows:
"Q. You heard of this Haymarket meeting, I suppose? A. Yes.
"Q. Have you formed an opinion upon the question of the defendants'
guilt or innocence upon the charge of murder, or any of them? A. I have.
"Q. Have you expressed that opinion? A. Yes.
"Q. You still entertain it? A. Yes.
"Q. You believe what you read and what you heard? A. I believe it;
yes.
"Q. Is that opinion such as to prevent you from rendering an impartial
verdict in the case sitting as a juror under the testimony and the law ? A.
I think it is."

At this stage of the examination he was "challenged for
cause" for the defendants, but before any decision was made
thereon the following occurred:
"Mr. Grinnell (for the State): If you were taken and sworn as a juror
in the case, can't you determine the innocence or the guilt of the defendants
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upon the proof that is presented to you here in court, regardless of your having any prejudice or opinion? A. I think I could.
"Q. You could determine their guilt or innocence upon the proof presented
to you here in court, regardless of your prejudice and regardless of your
opinion, and regardless of what you have read? A. Yes.
"The COURT: Do [can] you fairly and impartially try the case and render
an impartial verdict upon the evidence as it may be presented here and the
instructions of the court? A. Yes; I think I could."

The court thereupon overruled the challenge, but before the
juror was accepted and sworn he was further examined by counsel for the defendants, as follows:
"Mlr. Foster: I was going to ask you something about the opinion that
you have formed from reading the papers and from conversation. I believe
you answered me before that you had formed an opinion from reading and
hearing conversation. That is correct, is it? A. Yes; but I don't believe
everything I read in the newspapers.
"Q. No; but you believe enough to form an opinion? A. Yes; I formed
an opinion.
"Q. Was that opinion principally from what you read in the papers, or
was it from what you heard on the street? A. From what I read entirely.
"Q. Then you did believe enough of what you read to form an opinion
upon the question of the guilt or innocence of these men or some of them?
A. Yes.
"Q. And I believe you said you also expressed your opinion which you
have formed to others with whom you conversed ? A. Yes; I have expressed
that opinion.
"Q. During the expression of this opinion I will ask you whether you
stated in substance to these persons or any of them that you believed enough
of what you had read to form the opinion which you had?
"The COURT: Did you in any conversation that you had say anything as to
whether you believed or not the account which was in the newspapers which
you read? A. 'o, bir: I never expressed an opinion in regard to whether
the newspapers were correct or not.
"Q. You never discussed that matter at all? A. No, sir."

Then after some inquiries as to his business, age, and residence, the examination by the counsel for the defendants proceeded :
"Q. Are you acquainted with any members of the police force of the city
of Chicago that were present at the Iaymarket meeting on the occasion
referred to? A. No, sir.
"Q. Have you ever had any conversation with any one that undertook to
detail the facts as they occurred at the Haymarket Square, or who claimed
they had been there ? A. No, sir.
"Q. Is your opinion entirely made up of what you have read distinguished
from what you have heard ? A. Entirely from what I have read in the newspapers.
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"Q. Have you had much conversation with others in regard to it at or about
your place of business or elsewhere? A. We have conversed about it a number of times there in the house.
" Q. There is where you have expressed, I presume, the opinion which you
have formed? A. Yes, sir.

"Q.Do you know anything about socialism, anarchism, or communism?
A. No, sir; I do not.
"Q. Have you any prejudice against this class of persons? A. I think I
am a little prejudiced against socialism. I don't know that I am against
anarchism. In fact, I don't really understand what they are. I do not know
what their principles are at all.
'Q. I understand you to say that notwithstanding the opinion you formed
at the time you read the newspaper, that you now are conscious of the fact
that you can try this case and settle it upon the testimony introduced here?
A. Yes; I think I could.
" Q. And not be controlled or governed by any impression that you might
have had heretofore? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the law, as given you by the court, governing it? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. In the conversations that you have had there at the store, you say you
have expressed the opinion which you have formed before ? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Is that of frequent occurrence-that you have expressed the opinion
you have formed? A. Well, I think I have expressed it pretty freely.
'Q. As to the number of times-as to whether it was frequent or not?
A. Oh Ino; we did not bring the matter up in conversation very often, but when
we did we generally expressed our opinion in regard to the matter.
" Q. Your mind was made up from what you read, and you had no hesitancy in saying it-speaking it out? A. I don't think I hesitated.
"Q. Would you feel yourself any way governed or bound in listening to
the testimony and determining it upon the prejudgment of the ca-se you had
expressed to others before? A. Well, that is a pretty hard question to
answer.
"Q. I will ask you whether acting as a juor here you would feel in any
way bound or governed by the judgment that you had expressed on the same
question to others before you were taken as a juryman; do you understand
that? A. I don't think I would.
" Q. That is, you have now made up your mind, or at least you have formed
an opinion; you have expressed that freely to others. Now, the question is
whether when you listen to the testimony you will have in your mind the expression which you have given to others and have to guard against that and
be controlled by it in any way. A. No, sir; I don't think I would. I think
I could try the case from the testimony regardless of this.
"Q. I understand you to say that you believe that you can entirely lay to
one side the opinion which you have formed; it would require no circumstances or evidence to overcome it if you were accepted as a juryman ? A. I
think I could lay aside that opinion I have formed.
"Q. You believe that you could? A. Yes."
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Here the examination of the juror by the counsel for the defendants, so far as it seems to be important to the present inquiry,
was closed. Then on examination by the attorney for the State
the following appears :
"Q. Do you know anything of the counsel upon the other side? A. No,
sir.
"Q. You have men under you assisting you in shipping? A. No; there
are no men under me.
"Q. Do you belong to any labor organization? A. No, sir.
"Q. You stated, I believe, that you didn't know much about anarchism or
communism, and therefore you couldn't tell whether you had a prejudice or
not. A. No, sir ; I do not.
" Q. But you have read something about socialism ? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you believe in the maintenance of the laws of the State of Illinois
and the Government of the United Statei? A. Yes, sir; I do.
" Q. Have you any sympathy with any individual or class of individuals
who have for their purpose or object the overthrow of the law by force? A.
No, sir.
"Q. Have you any conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death
penalty in proper cases ? A. No, sir.
"Q. If taken as a juror in this case do you believe you could determine the
innocence or guilt of the defendants upon the proof presented to you here in
court, under the instructions of the court, regardless of everything else? A.
Yes; I think I could.
"Q. You know now of no prejudice or bias that would interfere with your
duties as a juror? A. No, sir.
"Q. Are you a socialist, a communist, or an anarchist? A. No, sir.
"Q. You have no associations or affiliations with that class of people, so far
a you know? A. No, sir."

At the close of this examination neither party challenged the
juror peremptorily, and lie was accepted and sworn. It is not
denied that when this occurred the defendants were still entitled
to 142 peremptory challenges, or about that number.
When the juror Sanford was called he was first examined by
counsel for defendants, and after some preliminary questions
and answers, the examination, still by counsel for the defendants, proceeded as follows:
"Q. You know what case is on trial now, I presume? A. Yes.

,Q. Have you any opinion as to the guilt or the innocence of the defend-

ants, or any of them, for the murder of Matthias J. Degan ? A. I have.
"Q. You have an opinion; you say you have formed an opinion somewhat
upon the question of the guilt or innocence of these defendants, do you mean,
or that there was an offence committed at the Haymarket by the throwing of
the bomb? A. Well, I would rather have you ask them one at a time.
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'IQ. All right. Have you an opinion as to whether or not there was an
offence committed at the Haymarket meeting by the throwing of the bomb?
A. Yes.
'IQ. Now, from all that you have read and all that you have heard, have you
an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of any of the eight defendants of the
throwing of that bomb? A. Yes.
"Q. You have an opinion upon that question also? A. I have.
"Q.Did you ever sit on a jury? A. Never.
"Q.I suppose you know something about the duties of a juror ? A. I presume so.
'IQ. You understand, of course, that when a man is on trial, whether it be
for his life or for any penal offence, that he can only be convicted upon testimony which is introduced in the presence and the hearing of the jury? You
know that, don't you? A. Yes.
" Q. You know that any newspaper gossip or any street gossip has nothing to
do with the matter whatever, and that the jury are to consider only the testimony which is admitted by the court actually, and then are to consider that
testimony under the direction, as contained in the charge of the court; you
understand that? A. Yes.
"Q. Now, if you should be selected as a juror in this case to try and determine it, do you believe that you could exercise legally the duties of a
juror-that you could listen to the testimony, and all of the testimony, and the
charge of the court, and after deliberation return a verdict which would be
right and fair as between the defendants and the people of the State of Illinois?
A. Yes, sir.
"Q. You believe that you could do that? A. Yes, sir.
,Q. You could fairly and impartially listen to the testimony that is introduced here? A. Yes.
'IQ. And the charge of the court and render an impartial verdict, you believe? A. Yes.
"1Q. Have you any knowledge of the principles contended for by socialists,
communists, and anarchists? A. Nothing, except what I read in the papers.
"Q. Just general reading? A. Yes.
"Q. You are not a socialist, I presume, or a communist? A. No, sir.
"Q. Have you a prejudice against them from what you have read in the
papers? A. Decided.
"1Q. A decided prejudice against them? Do you believe that that would
influence your verdict in this case, or would you try the real issue which is
here, as to whether these defendants were guilty of the muraer of Mr. Degan
or not, or would you try the question of socialism or anarchism, which really
has iothing to do with the case? A. Well, as I know so little nbout it in
reality at present, it is a pretty hard question to answer.
" Q. You would undertake-you would attempt, of course, to try the case
upon the evidence introduced here-upon the issue which is presented here?
A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Now, the issue, and the only issue which will be presented to this
jury, unless it is presented with some other motive than to arrive at the truth,
I think is, did these men throw the bomb which killed officer Degan? If not,
did they aid, abet, encourage, assist, or advise somebody else to do it? Now,
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EX PARTE: IN THE MATTER OF
that is all there is in this case; no question of socialism or anarchism to be
determined, or as to whether it is right or wrong. Now, do you believe that
you can try it upon that theory and return a verdict upon that theory and
upon that issue? A. Well, suppose I have an opinion in my own mind that
they encouraged it?
"Q. Keep it-that they encouraged it? A. Yes.
"Q. "Well then, so far as that is concerned I do not care very much what
your opinion may be now, for your opinion now is made up of random conversations and from newspaper reading, as I understand ? A. Yes.
"Q. That is nothing reliable. You do not regard that as being in the
nature of sworn testimany at all, do you? A. No.
"Q. Now, when the testimony is introduced here and the witnesses are examined and cross-examined, you see them and look into their countenances,
judge who are worthy of belief and who are not worthy of belief. Don't you
think then you would be able to determine the question? A. Yes.
"Q. Regardless of any impression that you might have, or any opinion?
A. Yes.
"Q. Have you any opposition to the organization by laboring men of associations, or societies or unions so far as they have reference to their own advancement and protection, and are not in violation of law? A. No, sir.
"Q. Ir.*3anford, do you know any of the members of the police force of
the city of Chicago? A. Not one by name.
"Q. You are not acquainted with any one that was either injured or killed,
I suppose, at the Iaymarket meeting ? A. No.

"Q. Mr."Sanford, are you acquainted with any gentlemen representing the
prosecution-these three gentlemen, Mr. Grinnell, Mr. Ingham, Mr. Walker,
and Mr. Furthman, who not here at the present time? A. No, sir,
"Q. You are: I presume, not acquainted with any of the detective officers of
the city of Chicago? A. Not to my knowledge.
"Q. "Now, Mr. Sanford, if you should be selected as ajuror in this case, do you
believe that, regardless of all prejudice or opinion which you now have, you
could listen to the legitimate testimony introduced in court and upon that and
that alone render and return a fair and impartial, unprejudiced and unbiased
verdict? A. Yes."

At the close of this examination on the part of the defendants,
the juror was challenged in their behalf for cause, and the
attorney for the State, after it was ascertained that all the peremltory challenges of the defendants had been exhausted, took
up the examination of the juror; and as to this the record shows
the following:
"Mr. Ingham: Mr. Sanford, upon what is your opinion founded-upon
newspaper reports? A. Well, it is founded on the general theory and what I
read in the newspapers.
"Q. And what you read in the papers? A. Yes, sir.
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" Q. Have you ever talked with any one who was present at the Haymarket
at the time the bomb was thrown? A,. No, sir.
I Q. Have you ever talked with any one who professed, of his own knowledge, to know anything about the connoction of the defendants with the
throwing of that bomb? A. No.
" Q. Have you ever said to any one whether or not you believed the statements of facts in the newspapers to be true? A. I have never expressed it
exactly in that way, but still I have no reason to think they were false.
"Q. Well, the question is not what your opinion of that was. The question simply is-it is a question made necessary by our statute, perhapsA. Well, I don't recall whether I have or not.
"Q. So far as you know, then, you never have ? A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you believe that if taken as a juror you can try this case fairly and
impartially, and render a verdict upon the law and the evidence? A. Yes."

At this stage of the examination the court remarked in reply
to some suggestion of counsel as follows:
"The Cour.T. The defendants having challenged for cause, which is overruled, can, of course, stand where they are without saying anything more;
but the effect of that, in my judgment, is that they accept the juror because
they can't help themselves. They have got no peremptory challenge; the
challenge for cause is overruled, and, necessarily, the question now is for the
State to say whether they will accept this juror or not. The common law is
that all jurors not challenged, or to whom the challenge is not sustained, are
the jurors to try the case. If they are not challenged for a cause which is
sustained, and if they are not challenged peremptorily, then they are necessarily the jury to try the case. Now, in this instance, the defendants have no
more peremptory challenges, and the challenge which they have made for
cause is overruled; therefore, so far as the defendants are concerned, he is a
juror to try the case."

This was accepted by both parties as a true statement of the
then condition of the case, and after some further examination
of the juror, which elicited nothing of importance in connection
with the present inquiry, no peremptory challenge having been
interposed by the State, Sanford was sworn as a juror, and the
panel was then complete.
This, so far as we have been advised, presents all there is in
the rfcord which this court can consider touching the challenges
of these two jurors by the defendants for cause.
In Reynolds v. The United States, 93 U. S. 145, 156, we said,
"that upon the trial of the issue of fact raised by" a challenge
to a juror in a criminal case on the ground that he had formed
and expressed an opinion as to the issues to be tried, "the court
will practically be called upon to determine whether the nature
and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily
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to raise the presumption of partiality. The question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact, and to be tried, as far as
the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that character,
upon the evidence. The finding of the trial court upon that
issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court unless the
error is manifest. * * * It must be made clearly to appear
that upon the evidence the court ought to have found the juror
had formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed
impartial. The case must be one in which it is maniftst the
law left nothing to the ' conscience or discretion' of the court."
If such is tile degree of strictness which is required in the ordinary cases of writs of error from one court to another in the
same general jurisdiction, it certainly ought not to be relaxed
i a case where, as in this, the ground relied on for the reversal
by this court of a judgment of the highest court of the State is,
that the error complained of is so gross as to amount in lav to
a denial by the State of a trial by an impartial jury to one who
is accused of crime. We are unhesitatingly of opinion that no
such case is disclosed by this record.
We come now to consider the objection that the defendant
Spies was compelled by the court to be a witness against himself. He voluntarily offered himself as a witness in his own
behalf, and by so doing he became bound to submit to a proper
cross-examination under the law and practice in the jurisdiction
where he was being tried. The complaint is, that he was required on cross-examination to state whether he had received a
certain letter, which was shown, purporting to have been written
by Johann Most, and addressed to him, and upon his saying
that he had, the court allowed the letter to be read in evidence
against him. This, it is claimed, was not proper cross-examination. It is not contended that the subject to which the crossexamination related was not pertinent to the issue to be tried,
and whether a cross-examination must be confined to matters
pertinent to the testimony-in-chief, or may be extended to the
matters in issue, is certainly a question of State law as administered in the courts of the State, and not of Federal law.
Something was said in argument about an alleged unreasonable search and seizure of the papers and property of some of
the defendants, and their use in evidence on the trial of the
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case. Special reference is made in this connection to the letter
of Most about which Spies was cross-examined; but we have
not been referred to any part of the record in which it appears
that objection was made to the use of this -evidence on that
account. And upon this point the Supreme Court of the State,
in that part of its opinion which has been printed with the
motion papers, remarks as follows:
"The objection that the letter was obtained from the defendant
by an unlawful seizure is made for the first time in this court.
It was not made on the trial in the court below. Such an objection as this, which is not suggested by the nature of the offered
evidence, but depends upon the proof of an outside fact, should
have been made on the trial. The defence should have proved
that the AMost letter was one of the letters illegally seized by the
police and should then have moved to exclude or oppose its
admission on the ground that it was obtained by such illegal
seizure. This was not done, and therefore we cannot consider
the constitutional question supposed to be involved."
Even if the court was wrong in saying that it did not appear
that the Most letter was one of the papers illegally seized, it
still remains uncontradicted that objection was not made in the
trial court to its admission on that account. To give us jurisdiction under § 709 of the Revised Statutes because of the denial
by a State court of any title, right, privilege, or immunity
claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of the
United States, it must appear on the record that such title, right,
privilege, or immunity was "specially set up or claimed" at the
proper time and in the proper way. To be reviewable here the
decision must be against the right so set up or claimed. As the
Supreme Court of the State was reviewing the decision of the
trial court, it must appear that the claim was made in that court,
because the Supreme Court was only authorized to review the
judgment for errors committed there, and we can do no more.
This is not, as seems to be supposed by one of the counsel for
the petitioners, a question of the waiver of a right under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, but a question of claim. If the right was set up or claimed in the proper
court below the judgment of the highest court of the State in
the action is conclusive, so far as the right of review here is
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concerned. The question -whether the letter, if obtained in the
manner alleged, would have been competent evidence is not
before us, and, therefore, no foundation is laid Under this objection for the exercise of our jurisdiction.
As to the suggestion by counsel for the petitioners Spies and
Fielden-Spies having been born in Germany and Fielden in
Great Britain-that they have been denied by the decision of
the court below rights guaranteed to them by treaties between
the United States and their respective countries, it is sufficient
to say that no such questions were made and decided in either
of the courts below, and they cannot be raised in this court for
the first time. Besides, we have not been referred to any treaty,
neither are we aware of any, under which such a question could
be raised.
Tile objection that the defendants were not actually present
in the Supreme Court of the State at tile time sentence was pronounced cannot be made on the record as it now stands, because
on its face it shows that they were present. If this is not in
accordance with tile fact, the record must be corrected below,
not here. It will be time enough to consider whether the objection presents a Federal question when the correction has been
made.
Being of opinion, therefore, that the Federal questions presented by the counsel for the petitioners, and which they say
they desire to argue, are not involved in the determination of
the case as it appears on the face of the record, we deny the writ.
Petition for writ of error is dismissed.
The application made in this particular case was a last desperate attempt,
so far as the courts of justice were
concerned, to save the condemned
anarchists from their well merited
doom. The application to the Supreme
Court of the United States failed, as
almost every lawyer supposed would
be the case. It is difficult to believe
that the lawyers who made the application ever could have had any
very grett confidence that it would
turn out otherwise; the truth of tme
matter being that there was really no

serious ground justifying the application. Before considering the legal
points involved a brief reference to
the facts of the case may prove of interest.
.flistory of the Case.-On the night of
Tue:sday, May 4, 1886, the anarchists of Chicago were holding a meeting in Haymarket Square, in that
city, when the police ordered the
crowd to quietly and peaceably disperse. One of the anarchists thereupon flung a bomb into the first r. nk
of the police, while others of time
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crowd opened on the officers with
their revolvers. The result was that
sixty-six members of the police force
were wounded or killed in the encounter. August Spies, Michael
Schwab, Oscar Neebe, Samuel Fielden, Albert R. Parsons. George Engel,
Adolph Fischer, and Louis Lingg
were arrested and indicted for murder. Their trial lasted from June
21 to August 20, four weeks having been consumed in the work of
procuring a jury, nine hundred and
eighty-one men having been called
into the jury-box and sworn to answer
questions.
It was the most remarkable trial
ever had in this country, resulting in
a conviction, which the Supreme
Court of Illinois sustained.
It does not appear that any of the
men who were indicted and convicted
threw the bomb.
The evidence
tended to show that the man who did
that was one Rudolph Schnaubelt.
At one time the police had him under
arrest but in sifting out of the two or
three hundred those whom they
believed the most guilty, they had
discharged this man, in ignorance of
the evidence against him, and he immediately fled to Germany. While
the indicted anarchists did not throw
the bomb, they had advised and
counseled, and incited the resort to
force, as the following quotation will
show:
For instance, Parsons, the editor of
an anarchist paper, called The Alarm,
had given such advice as this:
"The police and the constituted
authorities are your enemies. Rise
and annihilate them. The authorities
will use the militia against you. You
must use dynamite against them. Buy
rifles and be ready to use them. If
you can't buy rifles buy revolvers. If
you can't buy revolvers you can buy
enough dynamite for 2.5
cents to blow

the big Pullman Building there to
pieces. You know Marshall Field
and George M. Pullman? Those are
the people we'want to blow to hell.
Begin by blowing them up with dynamite. They are the enemies uf the
people-the men who have got rich
by the sweat of your brow. Do you
want clothing or food ? Take it from
the stores on State street. Take it all.
It is yours. If any man attempts to
stop you, stop him with a revolver.
Who will follow me to blow thebloodsuckers of the people to hell 7"
Another time he Faid:
"It is no use arguing. The only way
to convince these capitalists and robbers is to blow them to pieces with
gunsand dynamite."
On the day before the massacre,
Spies, who was the most influential of
the anarchists, had printed in his
paper, theArbeiterZeitung, the follow-

ing:
REVENGE!

"Workingmen to arms I
"The masters sent out their bloodhounds, the police. They killed six of
your brothers at McCormick's this afternoon. They killed the poor wretches
because they,like you, had the courage to disobey the supremq will of
your bosses. They killed them because they dared ask for the shortening of the hours of toil. They killed
them to show you 'free American
citizens' that you must be satisfied
and contented with whatever your
bosses condescend to allow you or you
will get killed I
"You have for years endured the
most abject humiliation; you have
for years suffered immeasurable iniquities; you have worked yourself
to death; your children you have
sacrificed to the factory lord-in short,
you have been miserable and obedient
servants all these years I Why? To
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satisfy the insatiable greed, to fill the
minous character of the opinion makes
coffers of your lazy, thieving masters I its reproduction in the American Law
Register impossible.
But it will
When you ask them now to lessen
your burden, he sends his bloodhounds
convince any lawyer who reads it
that the defendants were a most deout to shoot you-kill you I If you
are men, if you are the sons of your
praved set of scoundrels, who were
grandsires, who have shed their blood
engaged in a devilish conspiracy to
to free you, then you will rise in your
subvert the law and civil society, that
they had a fair and impartial trial, and
might, Hercules, an& destroy the
hideous monster that seeks to destroy
mobt richly deserved the fate that
you. To arms I we call you. To arms !
has at last overtaken them. It is to
be hoped that the opinion of the
Your brothers."
Fielden was addressing the Hay- court has taught all proclaimed
market meeting at the time the police
enemies of society the much-needed
approached. The following is an ex- lesson that it is not safe, even in this
tract from his remarks :
country, to threaten and incite blood"You have nothing to do with thelaw shed. The opinion makes the way to
except to lay hands on it and throttle
the gallows perfectly clear for all
it until it makes its last kick. Keep
apostles of anarchy.
your eye upon it. Throttle it. Kill it.
Right of the Supreme Court to Review
Stab it. * *
* What matters a Criminal Case.-F.rst. What right
it whether you kill yourself with
has the Supreme Court of the United
work or die on the battle-field resist- States to review the judgment of the
ing the enemy? What is the dif- Federal courts in criminal cases ?
ference? Any animal, however loathThe laws of the Unittd States do not
some, will resist when stepped upon.
provide for writs of error in crimnal
Are men less than snails or worms?
cases decided in the Circuit Courts of
I have some resistance in me. I know
the United States. ThQse courtsconthat you have, too."
sequently exercise a final jurisdiction
These quotations will sufficiently
in criminal cases, even though life
indicate the character of the ut- itself is at stake. While the defendterances which these anarchists inant in a criminal case has no right to
dulged in.
take his case cn writ of error from
On August 20, 188 , the jury
the Circuit Court to the Supreme
brought in a verdict, finding the deCourt, yet his case may come before
fendants guilty of murder, and fi :ing the latter court if the judges of the
death as the penalty in the ca-e of all
Circuit Court do not agree, and send
but Neebe, the penalty in his case
the case up on a certificate of a
being fixed at imprisonment in the .division of opinion. The Acts of
penitentiary for fifteen years. The
Congress provide that, "When any
case was carried to the Supreme
question occur on the hearing on
Court of Illinois on a writ of error,
trial of any criminal proceeding before
and the judgment against them was
a Circuit Court, upon which the judges
affirmed by that court in an opinion
are divided in opinion, and the point
written by Mr. Justice MAGRUDER,
upon which they disagree is certified
to the Supreme Court according to
and filed on September 14,1887. That
opinion is a masterly one, and reflects
law, such point shall be finally decided by the Supreme Court." Rev.
the greatest honor on Mr. Justice
MAGRUDER and the court. The voluStatuteS J 69i of Title XII.
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There is another way in which the
Supreme Court may sometimes interfere with a judgment rcndered in a
criminal case. For while a writ of
error does not lie to enable the court
to review the judgment on the ground
of error in the proceedings of the
Circuit Court, yet the Supreme Court
may issue a writ of habeas corpus and
discharge a prisoner held under an
erroneous judgment of the Circuit
Court when it appears that that court
had no jurisdiction to render the
See Ex parte Bain,
judgment.
American Law Register, July, 1887,
p. 433, note p. 444.
Second. What right has the Supreme Court of the United States to
review a judgment of the Supreme
Court of a State in a criminal case?
It is clear that the United States
Supreme Court cannot entertain jurisdiction to review such ajudgmenton
the ground that a right guaranteed
by the State Constitution has been
violated. See ,S'domons v. Graham,15
Wallace 209 (1872) ; MicheU v. Clark,
That court
110 U. S. 633 (1883).
can only review such a judgment on
the ground that some Federal question
is involved; that some right guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of
the United States has been violated.
Thus in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U. S. 365 (1885), the court announce: "Our jurisdiction is limited to the question whether the
plaintiff in. error has been denied a
right in violation of the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.
The question whether his imprisonment is illegal under the laws of the
State is not open to us.'
The Acts of Congress provide thjt
"A final judgment or decree in any
suit in the highest court of a State, in
which a decision in the suit could be
had, where is drawn in question the
validity of a treaty or statute of, or
VoL. XXXVI.-6

an authority exercised under, the
United States, and the decision is
against their validity; or where is
drawn in question the validity of a
statute of, or an authority exercised
under any State, on the ground of
their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in
favor of their validity; or where any
title, right, privilege, or immunity is
claimed under the Constitution, or
any treaty or statute of, or commission
held or authority exercised under,
the United States, and the decision is
against the title, right, privilege, or
immunity specially set up or claimed,
by either party, under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or
authority, may be. re-examined and
reversed or affirmed in the Supreme
Court upon a writ of error," etc.
Rev. Statutes of 1878, Title XIII,
709.
It is to be observed that when the
Supreme Court, under the provision
above cited, has the right to pass in
review on the judgement of a State
Supreme Court, it will not review the
decision except in so far as Federal
questions are presented: Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 269 (1885).
If a Federal question is involved
the writ of error can be allowed by
the Chief Justice of the State Supreme
Court or by any of the justices of
the Supreme Court of the United
States: Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 14 Wallace 27 (1871).
If the application is made to a
justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, while it may be made
to any of them, it seems to be understood that courtesy requires it to be
made to the justice who presides in
the circuit from which thecase comes.
Hence in the particular case the application was made to Mr. Justice HARL, whose circuit includes the State
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of Illinois. On his suggestion the
application was referred to the whole
court. A like application had been
similarly considered in open court in
Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wallace
321 (1868).
In the opinion in the particular
case the court do not dispose of the
point raised by counsel as to the
effect of tle Fourteenth Amendment in
extending to the States the limitations
which were originally applicable only
to the nation, as those limitations are
found in the first ten articles of
amendment to the Constitution. The
court did not find it necessary to decide that point, inasmuch as there
were no errors apparent on the record
even conceding the Fourteenth
Amendment to have the effect claimed
for it. Should the court in some
future case decide that that construction is to be given to the amendment, it
will necessarily result in largely extending the jurisdiction of the court
in criminal cases, to say nothing of
the revolution it will work in the
prevailing theory as to the power of
the States.
For instance, Article V, provides
that "no person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a grand jury." If
this, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, has became a limitation
on State pnwer, as well as on national,
an act of a State legislature providing
for trials, on informations is void, and
one thus convicted would have a right
to go to the Supreme Court of the
United States, to protect his right to
a trial as guarantetd by the fourth
article. This is but one illustration,
and it serves to show the sweeping
change that would be effected, not
merely in the jurisdiction of the Sullre-,:t Court, but in the relations existing between the States and the

United States, if the construction contended for should ever be adopted.
The court will no doubt soon be compelled to directly and squarely pass
on this subject, and we have little idea
that it will ever adopt the theory
advocated by the counsel of the condemned anarchists in this case.
Inciting the Commission of Crime.As we have already said, on the trial
of the anarchists, no evidence was
adduced that the defendants threw the
bomb. On what principle of law,
then, were they convicted of the
murder for which they were indicted ?
Before answering the question, we may
premise that the statutes of Illinois,
like the statutes of so many other
States haveabolished the common-law
distinction between principals and
accessories, and all the accessories before the facts are made principals, and
may be indicted and punished accordingly.
The following extracts from the
opinion of the Supreme Court of
Illinois will explain the principle upon which the defendants were convicted.
"If,therefore, the defendants advised, encouraged, aided or abetted
the killing of Degan, they are as
guilty as though they took his life with
their own hands. Ifanyof themstood
by and aided, abetted, or assisted in
the throwing of the bomb, those of
them who did so are as guilty as
though they threw it themselves."
Again. "If the defendants, as a
means of bringing about the social
revolution and as a part of the larger
conspiracy to effect such revolution,
also conspired to excite classes of
woikingmen in Chicago into sedition, tumult, and riot, and to the use
of deadly weapons and the taking of
human life, and for the purpose of
producing such tumult, riot, use of
weapons, and taking of life, advised
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and encouraged such classes by newspaper articles and speeches to murder
the authorities of the city, and a murder of a policeman resulted from such
advice and encouragement, then defendants are responsible therefor."
No one will venture to question the
accuracy of this statement of the law.
One who persuades another to commit a crime is himself guilty of the
crime if it is committed by virtue of
his advice. Thus it has been held
that if A persuades B to commit
suicide: A is guilty of the murder of
B: Conmonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass.
353 (1816). It isthere said: "The
government is not bound to prove that
Jewett would not have hung himself, had Bowen's counsel never reached his ear. The very act of advising
to the commission of a crime is of itself unlawful. The presumption of
law is, that advice has the influence
and effect intended by the adviser,
ui,less it is shown to have been otherwise. as that the counsel was received
with scoff, or was manifestly rejected
and ridiculed at the time it was given."
In .Jegina v. Sharpe, 3 Cox C. C.

233 (1S48), Chief Justice WILDE
stated the law as follows: " If persons are assembled toge-her to the
namber of three or more, and speeches
are made to those persons to excite
and inflame them, with a view to invite them to acts of violence, and if
that same meeting is so connected in
point of circumstances with a subsequent riot that you cannot reasonably sever the latter from the incite.
ment that was used, it appears to me
that those who incited are guilty of
tlhe riot, although they are not actually present when it occurs. I think it
is not the hand that strikes the blow
or that throws the stone that is alone
guilty under such circumstances, but
that he who inflames people's minds
and induces them by violent means

to accomplish an illegal object is himself a rioter, though he takes no part
in the riot. It will be a question for
the jury whether the riot that took
place was so connected with the inflammatory language used by the
defendant that they cannot reasonably
be separated by time or other circumstances." In this case the defendant
was indicted for sedition and riot. He
had addressed a large assembly of
persons, using very exciting and
inflammatory langoage. Shortly afterwards a large crowd moved towards a
church, in which several policemen
had been stationed, and began throwing stones and conducted themselves
in a violent manner. And to the
same effect are the text writers, " if one
purposely excites another to commit
an offence, as if he harangues people,
inflaming them to riot, and the offence is accordingly committed, lie is
guilty, though he personally takes no
part in it :" 1 Bishop's Cr. Law 640.
"Every one who incites any person
to commit any crime commits a misdemeanor whether the crime is committed or not." Stephens' Digest of
Criminal Law, Art. 47.
An Impartial Jury.-What is an
"impartial" jury in the sense in
which the term is used in the Constitution? Before considering this
question, we shall refer to the subject
of challenges, by which the right to
an impartial jury may be asserted.
The counsel forthe anarchists claimed
that the trial jury was not "impartial" in the constitutional sense,
and that they were prejudiced by the
ruling as to their challenges. It appears that under the laws of Illinois
each one of the eight anarchists was
entitled to a peremptory challenge of
twenty jurors, making the whole number allowed to the defence one hundred
and sixty. Of those called into the
jury box, seven hundred and fifty-sev-
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en were excused upon challenge for
cause, and one hundred and sixty
were challenged peremptorily by the
defence and fifty-two by the State. Of
the twelve jurors finally selected,
eleven were accepted by the defendants. Before the twelfth juror was
taken the defendants had exhausted
their peremptory challenges, and he
was challenged for cause and the
challenge overruled. The claim was
asserted before the Supreme Court of
Illinois that their peremptory challenges having been exhausted before
the panel was finially completed, the
court should review the action of the
trial court in those cases where challenges for cause were overruled, thus
compelling the defence to exercise
their peremptory challenges.
The
Supreme Court of Illinois, however,
held otherwise, and declared that it
must be made to appear that an objectionable juror was put on the defendants after they had exhausted
their peremptory challenges. This
ruling accords with the opinion which
the Supreme Court of the United
States had previously expressed in
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430 (1877),
and in Hayes v. fssoury4
i.
Id. 71 (1877)
and which is reiterated inthe particular case. And see to the same effect:
Loggins v. The Stlate, 12 Texas Ct. of
App. 65 (1882) ; 11oltv. State, 9 Texas
Ct. of App. 571 (1880) ; Bean v.State,
17 Texas Ct. of App. 60(1884) ; Steagald v. State, 22 Texas Ct. of App. 488
(1886); Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328
(1875); People v. MeGungill, 41 Cal.
430 (1871); State v. Simmons, 38 La.
Ann. 41 (1886); State v. Drake, 33
Kans. 151 (1885); Collins v. People,
103 Ill. 21 (1882) ; State v. Smith, 49
Conn. 379 (1881); State v. Hoyt, 47
Conn. 529 (1880); People v. Carpenter
102 N.Y. 238 (1886) ; Mimms v.State,
16 Ohio St. 221 (1865); Irwin v. State,
29 Ohio St. 186 (1876); Hartnet v.

State, 42 Ohio St. 578 (1885); State
v. Gooch, 94 N. C. 987 (1886) ; People
v. Wel, 40 Cal. 268 (1870); State v.
Brown, 15 Kans. 400 (1875); Preswood v. Stlate, 3 Ileisk. (Tenn.) 468
(1872); Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 742
(1853) ; Hlorton v. State, 1 Kans. 468
(1863); McGowan v. State, 9 Yerger
(Tenn.) 184 (1836); Alfred v. State, 2
Swan (Tenn.) 581 (1853); Ogle v.
State, 33 Miss. 383 (1857); Robinson
v. Randall, 82 Ill. 521 (1876).
A case must needs lean on a pretty
slender reed which at this day depends for a new trial, on the fact that
a challenge for cause was improperly
overruled, when the peremptory
challenges were not exhausted. There
is no ground of complaint in such
cases except as to jurors improperly
received after the peremptory challenges have been exhausted.
Now, inasmuch as this right of peremptory challenge is the right to reject and not to select jurors, if one
of two defendants peremptorily challenges ajuror, and theother defendant
insists that lie is qualified, the juror
should neverthelessbe excluded: State
v. Mzaker, 54 Vermont 112 (1881).
And because the right of peremptory
challenge is the right to reject and
not to select, the ruling of the trial
judge in rejecting a juror challenged
for cause by the State, affords, of itself, no legal ground of complaint to
the defendant: State v. Creech, 38
La. Ann. 480 (1886).
If there are several defendants, each
of them is entitled to the statutory
number of peremptory challenges, but
unless the statute expressly provides
otherwise the State will only have the
same number it would have if there
was only a single defendant: Schoeffler
v. State, 3 Wis. 839 (1854); Wiggins v.
State, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 738 (1878). And
see Smith v. State, 57 Miss. 822 (1880).
In the Wisconsin case explaining the
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reason for thus restricting the State's
right of challenge in a trial of joint
defendants, it says that if the statute
should be so construed as to allow the
prosecuting officer the statutory number of challenges for each defendant,
he could multiply such challenges indefinitely by simply increasing the
number of defendants, and that such
a construction might defeat the very
object and intent of this statute. In
Illinois the statutes provide that
"every person arraigned for any crime
punishable with death or imprisonment in the penitentiary for life shall
be admitted on his trial to a peremptory challenge of twenty jurors,
and no more ;" * * * "and that the
attorney prosecuting on behalf of the
people shall be admitted to a peremptory challenge of the same number of jurors that the accused is entitled to :" Rev. Stat. of Illinois,
18S5, p. 44 3, 432. Under this statute there being eight defendants, in
this particular case, the State was
considered to be entitled to one hundred and sixty peremptory challenges.
The addition of several counts to an
indictment does not enlarge the number of challenges: Commonwealth v.
Walsh, 124 Mass. 32 (1878).
Can the court exclude a juror on
its own motion? In State v. Ring, 29
Minn. 78, 81 (1882), the court excluded on its own motion a juror on
the ground of general disqualification.
No challenge for cause had been
made, and the defendant took an exception. The right of the court to
do this was sustained, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota saying: "It is
the duty of the court to supervise,
and within proper limits to control,
the trial of causes before it, to the
end that justice may be administered
in reality as well as in form. The
parties before the court might desire,
from different motives, to accept an

incompetent juror-one entirely un:
acquainted with our language; but
the court is not required to yield its
assent to such a proceeding, or take
part in such a trial. The parties
have the right to challenge for general disqualification; but their neglect to avail themselvesof that privilege does not prevent the court from
inquiring as to the capacity of a juror
to discharge intelligently the duties
of his place." In Greer v. State, 14
Texas Ct.of App. 181 (1883), it is announced that a court has no right on
its own motion to stand aside a juror
acceptable to both parties, unless the
juror is one absolutely prohibited by
law from sitting as a juror.
It is held that the right of peremptory challenge can be exercised
so long as the jury has not been sworn,
and notwithstanding a previous declaration of the party challenging that
he is satisfied with the jury: Jhonsv.
People, 25 Mich. 500 (1872); Hamper's Appeal,51 Id. 71 (1883). But the
right cannot be exercised after the
jury is sworn: People v. Dolan, 51
Mich. 610 (1883).
In Hayes v. Missouri, supra, the
Supreme Court of the United States
sustained the constitutionality of a
State statute providing that in capital
cases, in cities having a population of
over one hundred thousand inhabitants, the State shall be allowed fifteen
peremptory challenges to jurors, while
elsewhere in the State it is allowed
eight peremptory challenges in such
cases. This was held not to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. The following extract
from the opinion in that case will
prove of interest: "Originally, by
the common law, the crown could
challenge peremptorily without limitation as to number. By Act of Parliament, passed in the time of Edward I, the right to challenge was

EX PARTE: IN THE MATTER OF
restricted to challenges for cause.
But, by a rule of court, the crown
was not obliged to show cause until
the whole panel was called. If, whan
the panel was through, a full jury was
obtained, it was taken for the trial.
If, however, a full jury was not obtained, the crown was required to
show cause against the jurors who
had been directed to stand aside; and,
if no sufficient cause was shown, the
jury was completed from them."
That ajury should be "impartial"
requires that the jurors should be free
from all bias for or against the accuse I. And this leads us to inquire
what opinions disqualify a juror on
the ground that lieis not impartial
in the constitutional sense? There
can be no doubt but that the rule laid
down by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and which is sanctioned by the
Supreme Court of the United States
in this particular case, is almost everywhere recognized at the present day
as laying down the correct test by
which the competency of a juryman
is to be determined, who has an opinion based on newspaper statements.
It is quite a common thing for counsel to propound to a juror the question
whether liehas such an opinion as
will require evidence.to change it.
But, while some courts seem to recognize this as a test, the overwhelming
weight of authority does not regard it
as a proper test, as no rational person
ever has an opinion on any subject
which is changed or unmoved except
by evidence of some kind. Such a
juror is competent if lie states that he
can fairly and impartially render a
verdict in accordance with the law
and the evidence. The following
cases pass on this question where the
opinion is based on newspaper statements: People v. Brown, 59 Cal. 346
(IS31); Jones v. People, 6 Col. 4.36
(1882); State v. .Ioyt,47 Conn. 530

(1880); Montague v. State, 17 Fla. 662
(1880); Duyle v. State, 100 Ind. 259
(1884) ; Wilson v. People, 94 Ill. 299
(1880); State v. Spaulding, 24 Kans.
1 (1880) ; State v. Ford, 37 La. Ann.
444 (1885) ; Commonwealth v. Webster,
5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 297 (1850);
Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430 (1879);
White v. State, 52 Miss. 216, 221
(1876); Ulrich v. People, 39 Mich.
245 (1878); State v. Wilson, 85 Mo.
134 (184); Bohananr v. State, 18 Nebraska 57 (1885); State v. Carrick,16
Nevada 120, 126 (1881); State v. Pike,
49 N. I. 399, 407 (1870); State v.
Fox, 2.5 N. J. Law 566, 587 (1856);
People v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487
(1886); State v. Collins, 70 N. C. 241,
243 (1874); .3felughv. State, 42 Ohio
St. 154 (1884); Traviss v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. St. 597 (18S4) ; State v.
Dodson, 16 S. C. (N. S.) 453 (1881);
Spence v. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 539
(1885) ; Kennedy v. State, 19 Tex. Ct.
of App. 618 (1885); State v. Meyer,
58 Vt. 457 (1886) ; Dejarnette's Case,
75 Va. 867 (1881); State v. Sehnelle,
24 V. Va. 779 (1884). When the
opinion is based on having heard or
read evidence given on a former trial,
see Pierson v. State, 21 Texas Ct. of
App. 57 (1886); Thompson v. State, 19
Texas Ct. of App. 594 (1885); Wade
v. State, 12 Texas Ct. of App. 358
(1882); Marion v. State, 20 Nebraska
233 (1886); State v. Culler,82 Mo. 623
(1884); Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 343
(1875). When the opinion is based
on rumors, see Jackson v. State, 77
Ala. 23 (1884) ; Casey v. State, 37 Ark.
83 (1881); State v. McGee, 36 La.
Ann. 206 (1884); State v. Anderson,
5 Iarr. (Del.) 493 (1854); State v.
Reed, 89 Mo. 168 (1886); State v.
Green, 95 N. C. 611 (1886) ; Conatser
v. State, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 436 (1883) ;
Scioeffier v. State, 3 Wis. 833 (1854);
.Hutchinsonv. State, 19 Nebraska 262
(1886); State v. Boyd, 88 La. Ann.
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374 (1886). When the opinion is
based on conversation with witness,
see Penn v. State, 62 Miss. 450 (1884);
Walker v. State, 102 Ind. 502 (1885).
When the juror has conscientious
scruples against capital punishment,
see Smith v. State, 55.Miss. 411 (1877);
HUarrison v. State, 79 Ala. 29 (1885);
SUphenzon v. State, 110 Ind. 358

(1886);
(1882);
(1880);
(1882);
(1881);

Jones v. People, 6 Col. 452
Stratton v. People, 5 Col. 276
Coleman v. State, 59 Miss. 484
Spain v. State, 59 Miss. 19
State v. Leabo, 89 Mo. 247
(1886); State v.Hing, 16 Nev. 307
(1881). In Thompson v. State, 19
Texas Ct. of App. 594 (1885), it is
held that when a juror has conscientious scruples against the death penalty he is disqualified, although the
statute fixes the penalty at death or
imprisonment for life.
In .lutchiuonv. State, 19 Nebraska
262 (1886), it is held that unfriendly
feeling towards the attorney does not
constitute ground for a challenge for
cause.
In Boyle v. People,4 Col. 176 (1878),
it is held that the members of an association formed to check a certain
crime, are not per e incompetent as
jurors in a trial of one accused of such
crime, but that the judge is invested
with discretion in such cases. In
Commonwealth v. Moore, 143 Mass.
136 (1886), a juror was held incompetent who belonged to a Law and
Order League which employed the
complaining witness to enforce the
law and prosecute offenders. In

Stoots v. State, 108 Ind. 415 (1886), it
is held that a juror is incompetent
who admits that he would allow less
weight and credit to the testimony of
the defendant, if he should testify in
his own behalf, than he would if such
defendant were not engaged in the
business of selling liquor. In Carrow
v. Peple, 113 Ill. 550 (1885), it is
held to be no legal objection to the
competency of a juror that he does
not approve of selling liquor with or
without a license.
We cannot refrain from adding in
conclusion, that while all may regret
the necessity of ever sacrificing human life, there has rarely, if ever,
been a case in all our history where
the necessity of doing it was as great
as in the present instance. We can
have but little patience with men
who, having fled from foreign oppression, and the hard conditions of society in the Old World, to enjoy the
beneficent conditions of life in the
New, under a government more considerate of the conditions of the poor
than any government the world has
known, turn upon us and preach the
subversion of human government by
the use of the assassin's dagger, dynamite, and the torch. Such men are
ingrates and idiots, and worse. They
are the greatest criminals that walk
the earth, and thanks to the courts
and to the governor of Illinois in
this case it has been revealed that
the "velvet glove of Liberty incases
the merciless hand of the law."
HE

Y WADE ROGERS.
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
ROGERS el al. v. UNION CENT. LIFE INS. CO.
If a complaint shows the plaintiff entitled to part of the relief demanded,
it will be good on demurrer.
A married woman, who represents that she is executing a mortgage to
secure money for her own use is estopped, as against one who in good faith,
and after diligent inquiry, relies on such representations, from averring that
she executed the mortgage as surety for her husband.

APPEAL from Superior Court, Vigo county.
.icNutt & .toNutt and Pierce & Davis, for appellants.
I.

B. Jones, for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-The appellee's complaint is founded upon
promissory notes executed by Mary Jane Rogers, and a mortgage securing them executed by her and her husband, Newton
Rogers. The complaint is attacked by the assignment of errors
jointly made by the appellants, and, as the complaint is certainly
good as to one of them, the attack must fail even if it were
conceded that it was bad as to one of them. It is well settled
that a joint assignment of errors will not prevail if the complaint is good as to one of the appellants: Hoes v. Boyer, 108
Ind. 494 ; Hochstedlerv. Roelhstedler, 108 Ind. 506. We need
not, therefore, inquire whether the complaint is bad as to one of
the appellants, for, if we find it good as to either, we must hold
the attack upon it to be unavailing.
The only points made against the complaint which affects
both appellants are that it fails to aver that the notes are due
and unpaid, and alo fails to show to whom the notes are payable. The second point is based on a misapprehension of the
record, for the notes filed with the complaint show who the
payee is, and it is also shown in the body of the pleading that
the appellee is the payee of the notes. The first point is not
well taken, because, as to some of the notes, it is distinctly
averred that they are due and unpaid, and this would entitle
the plaintiff to some part, at least, of the relief demanded. It
is well settled that a complaint which shows the plaintiff enti-

ROGERS et al. v. UNION CENT. LIFE INS. CO.

tled to some relief will repel a demurrer: Bayless v. Glenn, 72
Ind. 5. But we think the complaint shows by fair implication
that all of the notes were due and unpaid, and this is certainly
sufficient after verdict.
Mary J. Rogers alleges, in her separate answer, that at the
time she executed the notes and mortgage she was a married
woman and the owner of the property mortgaged; that she executed the notes and mortgage as surety for her husband, and for
no other consideration. The appellee replied to this answer in
six paragraphs. To the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs
of this reply the appellant demurred. The demurrers were not,
however, addressed to each paragraph of the reply, but to all
the paragraphs collectively. If any one of these paragraphs
was good, there was no error in overruling the demurrer.
We think that some of the paragraphs were good. The facts
pleaded show that the appellee was informed by Mrs. Rogers
that the money she sought to obtain was for her own benefit;
that 6he was not undertaking as the surety of her husband ;
that the appellee believed her statements, and, relying on their
truth, loaned her the money she desired; and they show also,
that the appellee rightfully relied on her representations. Our
decisions -establish the rule that a married woman may estop
herself by her conduct from denying that a loan effected by her
was for her benefit. As said in Orr v. lT7die, 106 Ind. 341.
"She may now be bound by an estoppel in pais like any other
person." 'This has been expressly ruled in other cases : Togel v.
Eceihner, 102 Ind: 55; GUpp v. Campbell, 103 Ind. 213; Iard
v. Berkslire Life Ins. Co., 108 Ind. 301. In the case last cited
the facts were very similar to those pleaded in the reply
before us, and, after a full discussion of the question, it was
held that the married woman was estopped to deny that the
money was obtained for her own benefit. We did not hold in
that case that the form or recitals of the contract will work an
estoppel, nor do we so hold in this. What we hold is that by
her conduct and representations, relied upon by one who contractcd with her in good faith, she is estopped to deny the
character of her contract. If the party with whom she contracts does not act in good faith, or if he knows or has the
means of ascertaining the truth, he cannot successfully insist
VoL. XXXVL-7
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upon an estoppel. But the presumption is against bad faith,
and until the contrary appears that presumption must prevail.
We think that we were right in holding that, where it appears
that the disability of coverture exists, it devolves upon the
party seeking the judgment to show that the contract was one
which the married woman had capacity to make: Vogel v.
Leichner, supra; CUpp v. Campbell, supra. But this does not
prevent the party from showing that he relied upon the conduct
of the married woman. It would be a fraud which she will
not be allowed to perpetrate for her to repudiate her representations as against one who has in good faith relied upon them.
Our decisions all recognize the rule that, under the provisions
of the Act of 1881, a married woman may be estopped, and
that when she attempts to deny what she has previously affirmed,
she is guilty of a legal fraud. Upon the admitted facts stated
in the reply, the appellant, Mary J. Rogers, was estopped to
deny the character of the contract into which she entered.
There was no error in refusing a jury trial. The suit was of
equitable cognizance, and the whole issue became one for the
Chancellor, and not for the jury; Carmichael v. Adams, 91
Ind. 526 ; Fieldv. Holzman, 93 Ind. 205 ; Quarl v. Abbett, 102
Ind. 233-239 ; Broumv. Russell, 105 Ind. 46, and cases cited.
It is contended that the judgment should be reversed because
the bill of exceptions does not show that any evidence was
given, but does show that testimony was offered. The appellants take a very erroneous view of the subject. Upon them
rests the burden of showing error in the record, and if all the
evidence was necessary to show this, it was for them to bring it
into the record. If the evidence is not all in the record, the
If the
presumption that the trial court did right will prevail.
bill of exceptions is defective, the appellants must suffer, and
not the appellee. Judgment affirmed.
The only question of general interest involved in this case is, whether
and how the doctrine of estoppel is
applied to a married woman ? Estoppel is where a person sui juris, by
words or conduct intentionally causes
another to believe in the existence of

certain facts, which induces him to act
on that belief, so as to alter his previous condition, the former is estopped from averring against thelatter
a different state of facts as existing at
the same time: 1 Saund. 326; Pickard
v. &ars, 6 A. & E. 469; 2 Nev. & P.
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488; 3falloneyv. Horan, 49 N.Y. 111; juris powers: Bichardson v. Hittle,
31 Ind. 119; Witbeck v. Witbeck, 2.5
Anthony v. Stephens, 46 Ga. 241 ; Cady
Mich. 439; .Reagan v. .Folliman, 34
v. Owen, 34 Vt. 598; Lyman v. CessTex. 403; Moxie v. Price,31 Wis. 82;
ford, 15 Iowa 229. And such estoppel
operates only in favor of parties af- Canty v. Sanderford, 37 Ala. 91; n re
Lush's Trust, L. R., 4 Ch. Ap. 591;
fected, and not in favor of those upon
Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382; Palmer
whom it had no influence: IWlcdonv.
v. Gross, 1 Sm. & M. 48; Towlers v.
Champlin, 59 Barb. 62; Orenahnw v.
areek, 52 Mo. 98; Malony v. Ioran, Fisher,77 N. C. 4.13; Lyman v. Cess49 N. Y. 111; Guthrie v. Howard, 32 ford, 15 Iowa 233 ; Schwartz v. SaunIowa 54; 3cDanielv. Carver, 40 Ind. ders, 46 I. 18; Cual Co. v. Pasco, 79
Id. 170; Sharpe v. Poy, L. R, 4 Ch.
2:50; 1ran M3etre v. Tiojf, 27 Iowa 341.
Ap. 3.5; Jones v. Frost, L. R., 7 Ch.
It may be affirmed that the full
Ap. 773; contra, Bemis v. Call., 10
doctrine of estoppel has not been apAllen 512; Palmer v. aoss, 1 Sm. &
plied to a married woman, because
M. 48; Rangdey v. Spring, 21 Me. 130.
she is more or less under certain disabilities and is not in fact suijuris: In proportion, therefore, as the enabling statutes have removed a marStephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119;
ried woman's disabilities under the
Lowell v. Daniels, 2 Gray 161; Keen
common law, so her capacity to be
v. Hlartman, 12 Wright (Pa.) 497;
Keen v. Coleman, 3 Id. 299; M.irtin bound by estoppel is also enlarged;
v. Ml[artin, 22 Ala. 86; Lothrop v. Fs- and conversely, in proportion as the
common law disabilities remain, or
ter, 51 Me. 367; Burns v. Lynde, 6
exist, so also the doctrine of estoppel
Allen 305; Towles v. Fisher, 77 N. C.
does not operate, and does not apply:
443; L'yman v. Cessford, 15 Iowa 233.
Bodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93; Lyman
IIence, as a married woman had no
v. Cessford, 15 Iowa 229; Grove v.
capacity to make a contract at comJeager,60 Ill. 249; Schwartz v. Saunmon law, any attempted or quasiconders, 46 Id. 18; hence, acts which betract she might enter into were void,
and did not create an estoppel: Glid- fore the enabling statute would not
den v. Strupler, 2 P. F. Sm. 400; Plu- have bound a married woman by way
mer v. Lord, 5 Allen 460; Davenport of estoppel may do so now, under
v. Nelson, 4 Camp. 2-5 ;..Bodine v. Kil- these statutes, upon the principle
leen, 53 N. Y. 93; Todd v. Railroad, above stated: Lyman v. Cessford,
supra;Grove v. Jeager,supra; Upshaw
19 Ohio St. 514; for the very good
v. Gibson, 53 Miss.314. But as there
reason that if she could bind herself
are no enabling statutes which make
by way of estoppel, this would destroy
a married woman suijuri in every
her incapacity to contract at common
respect without qualification or limlaw and present the contradictions,
itation, and as a married woman can
'that although at common law a maronly contract with respect to her
ried woman cannot enter into a conseparate estate, the law of estoppel
tract, yet she can make such contract
can only attach to that separate estate
way of estoppel. The statutory
$y
.enactments changing the common
law directly or indirectly: Wood v. Terry,
30 Ark. 393.
with respect to married women enThe doctrine of estoppel as applied
larged her capacity to contract and
under the enabling statutes to the acts
carried with it the doctrine of estopof a married woman arises out of, and
pel in proportion to the enlargement
has its origin in, fraud-some affirmaof her power to contract and othersui
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tive act of fraud, upon which a prudent person might and did rely to his
injury: Towles v. Fisher, 77' N. C.
443; Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill. 18;
Sharpe v. Foy, L. R., 4 Ch. Ap. 35;
Zones v. Frost, L. R., 7 Ch. Ap. 773;
not a silent or passive act, such as
mere silence in regard to her rights:
U. S. Bank v. Lee, 13 Pet. 118; Palmer
v. -oss, 1 Sm. & M. 68; Drake v.
Glorer,30 Ala. 382; Harener v. Godfrey, 3 W. Va. 426 ; contra, Lindner v.
Sehler, 51 Barb. 322; Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 10 C. E. Green 194, but a
positive, active, fraudulent act or
statement: Ainsley v. Mead, 3 Lans.
116; Westgate v. Munroe, 100 Mass.
227; such as where she made a sworn
disclaimer of ownership: Cooley v.
Steele, 2, Head 605; Lathrop v. Association, 45 Ga. 483; Craren v. Booth,
8 Tex. 243; or where she announced
at the sale of her husband's real estate
that she would not claim dower, and
the purchasers, relying upon her
statement, made the purchase: Connolly v. Branstler, 3 Bush 702; or her
false recitals in her deed: Jones v.
Frost, L. R., 7 Ch. Ap. 773; or her
active connivance in her husband's
fraud, produced by her loaning - her
credit for that fraudulent purpose:
Anderson v. Armstead, 69 Ill. 456;
Bodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93; Anderson v. O'Ridly, 54 Barb. 620; or
knowingly permitting her husband to

obtain credit on the faith of property
which in truth belongs to her: Besson
v. Breland, 11 C. E. Green 471; Zimmner v. Dansby, 56 Ga. 79. See Dayton
v. Fisher, 34 Ind. 356.
A married woman can only be
divested of her separate estate in the
method and manner prescribed by the
law: Morrslon v. Wilson, 13 Cala.
493; M ntosh v. Smith, 2 La. Ann.
758; Bisland v. Prorasty, 14 La. Ann.
169; and as estoppel applies to executed, not executory, contracts of a
married woman, everycontract which
she, by false representations, induces
another to enter into with herself, is
not an estoppel: Keen v. Hlartman,
12 Wright (Pa.) 497; Keen v. Coleman, 3 Id. 299; Lowell v. Daniels, 2
Gray 161. It depends upon the line
of demarkation above stated, and containing in some degree the elements
of fraud, and injury or damage to another: Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat.
238; Lane v. Berry, 2 Duv. 282;
Mounger v. Duke, 53 Ga. 281 ; Brown
nimbrough, 51 Ga 35.
v.
The general rule is that in proportion as a married woman's disabilities
at common law are removed by the
enabling statutes, she is within that
degree bound by estoppel in pais like
any person suijuris.
JOHN F.

KELLY.

Bellaire, Ohio.

Cort of Appeals of Kentucky.
WHEAT v. BANK OF LOUISVILLE.
The appellee, a banking corporation, was a creditor to a large amount of the
firm of W. & D., and its president, without express authority, and without
advising the directors, agreed to a composition between the firm and its creditors. The directors held meetings between the time of the failure of W. &
D. and the proposal of a composition, and also between the time of the proposal and the time of the acceptance of the composition. The board took no
action in the matter, but at its meetings each member had expressed oppcsi-
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tion to a compromise.
to act in .uch matters.
(on1the appellee.

There was no evidence of any custom of the president
Irclk, that the action of its pre.ident was nut binding

In order that the eireunstances of a particular case may be sufficient to
rai.e a lresumption Of authoritv in a bank president to bind the bank in natters be.vond the scope (if his usual authority, the bank must in some manner
be a party to the circumstances, or iust be chargeable with knowledge of
thenm.
Where an answer, in setting up an agreement with a bank, merely averred
that the bank was represented by its president, but did not aver any authority
in the pre-ident to repre-ent or bind the bank, and the reply denied the alleged a-reement. liut did not aver that the president had no authority to act

for it, held, that the authority of the president was in issue.
APPEAL

Chas. I.

from Louisville Chancery Court.

Gibson, for appellant.

Ifrtnilton Payne and I1 n. Lindsay, for appellee.
IIoLT, J.-Wheat & Dnrff, doing business as merchants,
made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors. The
trustee instituted this action to settle the trust. The appellee,
the Ban.k of Louisville, having been made a defendant, asserted
a considerable indebtedness against the firm, and made its answer a cross-petition against its members. The appellant, John
L. Wheat, alone filed an answer to it. Ie does not deny the
indebtedness, but avers that shortly after the failure the creditors, at a creditors' meeting, agreed with Wheat & Durff and
each other to accept fifty per centum of their claims in full discharge thereof; and that the bank so agreed, being represented
at the meeting by its president. The answer firther avers, as
the indebtedness of the firm to the bank was evidenced by paper
which it had indorsed to it, and upon which other parties were
previously liable, that, subsequent to the making of the composition agreement, it was further agreed between Wheat & Durff
attd tie bankthat the latter should collect the indebtedness so
far as possible from those first liable therefor, and when no
more could be collected, that then Wheat & Durff should pay
to the bank fifty per centum of the amount uncollected, antd in
consideration thereof be discharged friom all firther liability.
The bank by a reply denies that it ever made either agreement ;
and it is now insisted that, inasmuch as it does not aver that its
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president had no authority to act fir it at the creditors' meetings,
this must be taken as pro confesso, and his action considered as
its action. The answer, however, does not aver that the appellee's president had authority to agree to the composition, but
merely says that the bank was represented at the two creditors'
meetings by its president, without averring that he was authorized to so represent it, and that the bank agreed to the settlement. Upon this state of pleading the authority of its president to bind it by any such agreement must be regarded as in
issue.
The evidence is somewhat conflicting as to whether all of the
creditors present at the creditors' meeting, or the president of
the bank, did then agree to the composition. The decided burden of the testimony, however, supports this view, and we
think it may be safely so assumed. The appellant testifies that
the second agreement above named was made with the appellee's
president alone, so that, when the appellant now urges that the
bank's recovery should be confined to a sum equal to fifty per
centum of its debt, the question arises whether it is bound by
the action of its president aslabove indicated. If it be answered
in the negative, then it will be necessary to consider the other
questions that have been ably presented in argument. The charter of the bank gives him no such power. It provides that the
administration of its affairs shall be under the control of a board
of directors. It is conceded in argument, upon the part of the
appellant, that he had no express authority to so bind the bank,
and that he never advised its board of any such action by him.
Neither is it contended that he, virtute offtcii merely, could compromise or release its debt. If he had such power, it must be
traced to the assent of the board of directors, either express or implied. In truth, the position of president of a bank is one of dignity
rather than power. There is an indefinite general responsibility
attached to the place. He is expected to watch more closely
the daily transactions of the bank than the other directors ; and
while they, or usage, may confer upon him special powers, and
extend his authority, yet that inherent in the position is very
slight. Indeed, it seems by judicial decision to be confined to
taking charge of the litigation of the bank. Mr. loore says:
"The same species of limitation in the power of the president
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forbids him to surrender or release claims of the bank against
any person, from whatsoever source arising, or to stay the collection of an execution against the estate of a judgment debtor.
For either of these acts is the exercise of a discretionary authority over the affairs and property of the bank, which is the peculiar and exclusive province of the directors." Moore, Banks
and Banking, 133. This is the general rule; and undoubtedly
he has no power by virtue of his office to bind the bank in an
unusual manner, or in any undertaking outside of its customary
routine of business. No authority goes beyond this line. It
was held in Smith v. Lawson, 18 W. Va.212, that the president
of a bank could not transfer or assign a note belonging to it;
in Olney v. Ch'adsey, 7 R. I. 224, that he could not surrender
the securities held by his bank to secure a debt; in Iodge's
Ex'r v. Bank, 22 Grat. 51, that he had no right to release a
debt owing to his bank; and in the case of Bank v. Dann, 6
Pet. 51, that his agreement that the indorser upon a note should
not be liable was not binding upon the bank.
It is contended, however, that the president of the appellee
acted under such circumstances as to raise the presumption that
he was empowered by it to so act; and that, third parties being
therefore equitably entitled to rely upon his representations, the
law will presume the authority, and hold the bank bound by his
action, if not ultra vires, although in point of fact he had no
such authority, or was even acting in violation of the instructions of its board of directors. The bank must, however, in
some way be a liarty to such circumstances, or chargeable with
notice or knowledge of them, in order to so hold; and this
record fails to exhibit such a state of case. It is true that the
appellee's debt was a large one, and its directors were therefore
likely to watch closely whatever steps were taken looking to its
payment, or the settlement of the trust estate. They held several meetings between the time of the failure of Wheat & Durif
and the first creditors' meeting, when the composition was proposed; and also between such first meeting and the second one,
when it was accepted. They probably knew their president
attended these meetings; but these circumstances did not, in our
opinion, authorize third parties to presume that they had given
the president unlimited authority in the matter, or the power to
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agree to a composition of the debt. In fact, the evidence shows
that while no vote had been taken in the board of directors, yet
each'member had at its meetings expressed himself as opposed
to: accepting anything less than the full amount of it. The
president'of a, corporation may without express authority perform all acts which are properly incident to the trust reposed in
him, or which necessity or custom may impose upon the office.
The release or composition of a debt due to a bank, however, is
a matter peculiarly within the province of its directory. If
-there,be any matter which more than any other falls within the
scope -of their duty, it is this one, because it not only affects the
prosperity of the institution, but may involve its very existence.
Necessity does not,require the president to exercise his judgment
-'alone as to it; indeedithet proper management of a bank dictates that he should not do so, and it is not, therfore, a matter
incident to theperformance of his duty, There is no evidence
"whatever in this recordthatit had been customary for the president of the appellee to ,control such matters, or to agree to the
Srelese -,or composition of the debts of the bank, without express authority, from its directory, and we fail to see upon what
*,grdund1th~rd ;parties had an !equitable right to, beliqve that, he
had such.power. If he had been, in tjie habit of doing so, by
,the consent or with the knowvJedge of the directors of the bank,
oi-f they by act or conduct badi held him out to the public as
authorized to do so, then a proper policy, as well as common
justice to third parties dealing with him in good faith, would
estop the appellee from now denying his authority. it not
ha(-ing done so, and having in no wayauthorized, recognized,
"or ratified his action, it is not bound by it; and the judgment
below for the entire debt must therefore be, and is, affirmed.
-

-The principles of the law as to the
powers of a bank president are stated
by the court in the preceding case in
conformity with the text-books on
that subject: Morse, Banks and Banking 143 et seq.; Morawetz, Private
Corporations, ? 537, 538. Perhaps
the most concise, and at the same
time a not inaccurate summary of
them, would be to say that the law

regards this officer as the president
of the board of directors, rather than
as the president of the bank. In very
many banking institutions (and formerly, perhaps, more generally than
to-day) thiswouldbe acorrectdescription of his position; but in the great
financial institutions of the country
of which the management as well as
the gzneral policy is directed by the
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president, it is scarcely accurate. Yet
there does not appear to be any tendency on the part of the courts to
modify the rule of the earlier decisions, and in dealings with a bank the
law says that the authority of the
president to bind the institution,
either in the particular instance or in
general, must be shown in something
more than his mere occupancy of the
position of president.
It is stated, indeed, by the text
writers that one thing the president
can do, and by his acting therein bind
the bank. "This solitary function is
to take charge of the litigation of the
bank. There is no question that this
matter belongs to him by virtue of
his office. * * * Counsel requested by
him to act for the bank will bind it
by their action in the case, within the
ordinary powers of counsel, by sole
authority of their engagement by him.
Nor will it make any difference,
though circumstances render that engagement originally wrong or improper." Morse, Bank and Banking
144, citing, Savings Bank of Cincinnati
v. Benton, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 240; American lns. Co. v. Oakley, 9 Paige 498;
.1f'amford v. Hawkins, 5 Denio 355;
Oakley v. ]Vorkingmen!s Benevolent Society, 2 Rilt. 487; Alexandria Canal
Co. v. Swann, 5 Row. 83. Thispassage
from Mr. Morse's book is cited in
later cases with the approval of the
court apparently (e. g.,
in f1odge's Executor v. First National Bank of Richmond, 22 Gratt. 51, 58; First National
Bank of Wellburg v. Kimberlandz, 16
W'.Va. 555, 578), but it cannot be
said to be supported by any later decision. Of the cases on which Mr.
Morse relies, the first is so badly reported that it does not appear whether
the action was brought by counsel
who had been employed by the president or not. If the plaintiff was not
so employed, then the case is only
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authority for the statement by the
court (Sterson, C. J.) that "The
president of the bank, being its chief
executive officer, had a right as such
to appear and answer for it, and employ counsel for its defence," and as
to the present point is of no value, for
the authority of the president qua
president was not in controversy
(Bank v. Benton, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 240,
244). The case of the American Ins.
Co. v. Oakley, 9 Paige 496, 501, sustains Mr. Morse's position, the court
affirming the president's authority to
act for the bank in such matters, and
adding, "If the president -xceeded
his authority in giving such power,
the corporation should look to him
for any damage it may have sustained
by this act of his." In .urnford v.
Hawkins, 5 Denio 355, 358, the court
approve and follow the case of the
Insurance Co. v. Oakley, but also lay
stress upon authority or ratification
by the directors. The case of Oakley
v. Wyorkingmen's Beneficial Society, 2
IIilt. 487, is one in which the Common Pleas Court affirmed the right of
the president of the defendant society
to appear as its attorney in fact; and
the last case, that of the Alexandria
Canal Co. v. Suann, 5 Iow. 83, is not
a point. The question there was
whether the power was vested in the
president and directorsor in the stockholders.
On the other hand, it has been decided in Massachusetts that the president of a manufacturing corporation
has no authority as such to commence
an action in the name of the corporation: Ashuelot Man. Co. v. Marsh, 1
Cush. 507; it has been decided in
Connecticut that where the bank was
accustomed to appoint its attorneys
by vote of the directors, the acceptance of service of process by an a:torney authorizcd to accept such service
by the president did nAt constitute a
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legal service upon the bank: Bridgeport Savings Bank v. Eldredge, 28
Conn. 556; and it has been held by a
court of first instance, but of great
eminence in Pennsylvania (0. P. 1 of
Phila.), that a power of attorney to
institute suit executed by the president of a bank without authority from
the board of directors, is not sufficient.
It is true that the judge was of opinion that there was an implied restriction on the president's authority in
the by-laws of the particular bank,
but upon the general question he says
the authorities are conflicting. ALLisox, P. J., in Citizens' Bank v. Keim,
10 Phila. 311.
In view of these decisions, the position of Mr. Morse that the president
has undoubted authority to bind the
bank in all questions affecting its litigation cannot be sustained as universally true. The position that in other
matters he binds the bank only where
he has had authority to act for the
institution conferred upon him (that
such authority, in other words, is not
inherent in his office) is unquestionably sound, as an examination of the
cases will show. Thus he has not ex
officio the power to transfer its property or securities, and in the absence of
authority to transact such business,
an assignment of the property of the
corporation, or an order given by him
to pay its money to a third person
will not operate to divert the right of
the corporation: Augusta Bank v.
Hamlin, 14 Mass. 180; Gibson v. Goldthwaite, 7 Ala. 281, 293; and see First
NationalBank of Sturgisv. Bennett, 33
Mich. 520; nor has he the power to
mortgage, assign, or pledge the bank's
property: Hoyt v. 2Tompson, 1 Seld.
320; Leggett v. New Jersy Man. and
Banking Co., Saxt. Ch. 542; nor to
draw checks: Fulton Bank v. New
York and Sharon Canal Co., 4 Paige
127, 135; Neiffer v. Bankof Knoxville,

1 Head 162, nor to surrender or release claims of the bank against any
person, nor to stay the collection of
an execution: Olney v. Chadsey, 7 R.
I. 224; Brouwer v. Appleby, 1 Sandf.
158; Spyker v. Spence, 8 Ala. 333;
nor to authorize over-drafts by depositors: Oakland Bank of Savings v.
Wilcox, 60 Cal. 126; nor to make a
deed conveying land for the benefit of
creditors: AlcKeag v. Collins, 87 Mo.
164; and see generally Davis v. Bandell, 115 Mass. 547; First National
Bank of Wdlsburg v. .Kimberlands, 16
'W. Va. 555; Hodges Executor v. First
.NationalBank of Bichmond, 22 Gratt.
51.
In a very large number of its transactions the president acts for the
bank, and the idea of questioning his
authority very seldom arises. Occasionally, however, it is disputed, and
it must then be sustained by showing
that power to act as he has acted was
vested in him (1) by provisions in the
charter or by-laws; (2) by express
authorization by the board of directors in the paticular case; (3) by general authority conferred upon him by
the board to act in similar cases,
which may be established by proof of
their acquiescence in his so acting in
such numerous instances as to justify
third parties in assuming that general
authority had been conferred upon
him; and (4) by ratification of his act
by the board.
Cases arising under the first and
second of these heads are cases of interpretation or evidence, not likely to
afford rules of general applicability;
see, for example, Augusta Bank v.
.ambjet, 35 Me. 491; Mount Sterling
Turnpike Co. v. Looney, 1 Metc. (Ky.)
550; Farmers'Bank v. 1'fc2see, 2 Penn.
St. 318; Bidgway v. Farmers' Bank,
12 S. & R. 236; Mfacbean v. Irvine, 4
Bibb 17; A/eclmer v. Bank of the
United States, 8 Wheat. 334.
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Cases under the third and fourth
heads are of more importance, because
more generally applicable. In )Toyt
v. Thompson, 1 Seld. 320, 335, the
court says, "Although in many cases
the corporations have been held
bound by such acts, this has been on
the ground that these officers have
been permitted by the directors to
take the entire managementinto their
own hands--and thus held out to the
public as authorized agents for that
purpose-or on the ground of subsequent satisfaction of the act, and that
such ratification is equivalent to an
original authority."
In Neiffer v.
The Bank of Knoxville, 1 Head 162,
165, the court says: "In the absence
of the cashier the practice is for the
president to draw and sign checks,
etc., without any special authority for
that purpose. And the proof further
establishes that the practice in this
particular bank, from its first organization, had been for the president to
draw checks in the absence of the
cashier." In this case the bank was
held to be bound by a check so drawn,
although at the time a cashier to act
temporarily in the absence of the
regular cashier had been appointed.
In Libby v. Union National Bank. 99
Ill. 622, the president, had purchased
real estate for the bank to s~cure a
debt. The court says (p. 630): "The
next question in order seems to be
whether Mr. Coolbaugh had authority
to act for the bank in this regard. * *
1e was the general agent and manager of the affairs of the bank, and
had been since its organization. This
the proof shows abundantly. His
powers, as shown by a long course of
action, known to and acquiesced in,
and evidently approved by the directors, fully warranted him in accepting,
in satisfaction of suspended paper,
any valuable thing which, in his
iudgment, it seemed wise to accept.

It is strenuously insisted, because
there is no special grant of such
power to him, as president, found in
the by-laws, that lie had in fact no
such power. There are many things
done daily in 'every bank which are
in fact and in law the acts of the
bank, and of which no mention is
made in the by-laws." Thebankwas
held to be bound by the acts of the
president. And see also Foster v.
Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479; Dougherty
v..lunter, 54 Penn. St. 380; Parker
v. Donnally, 4 W. Va. 648; Burton v.
Barley, 9 Biss. C. C. 253.
In the ease of Bich v. State National
Bank, 7 Neb. 201, we find a good example of cases of ratification by a
bank. The president agreed to give
ten shares of the stock of the bank to
the plaintiff in consideration of his
giving to the bank the business of his
firm and becoming a director. Plaintiff having performed in good faith
his part of the agreement, the court
held that the agreement (which was,
of course, beyond the power of the
president virtute oflcii) had been ratified by the bank acquiescing and receiving the benefit of it. A number
of cases are cited in this opinion upon
this point.
Cases arise in which there is a dispute whether the president, in performing the act, out of which the
controversy arises, was acting as presiden.t or in his individual capacity.
Without enlarging upon these, it is
sufficient in this note to cite Sterling
v.Xarietta& Susquehanna Trading Co.,
11 S.& R., 179; Terrell v. BranchBank
at .11obile, 12 Ala. 502; ".arkleyv.
.hodes, 59 Iowa 57 ; Prosserv. First
National Bank of Buffalo [Court of
Appeals of New York], 9 Central
Reporter 164, as examples.
Admissions of the president of a
bank, of course, bind the bank, when
as to matters within the scope of his
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agency: Spalding v. Bank of Susquehanna County, 9 Penn. St. 28; when
as to other matters the bank is not
bound: Stewart v. Huntingdon Bank,
11 S. & R. 267; tapes v. Second National Bank of Titusville, 80 Penn. St.
163. And see on this subject Kennedy
v. Otol County National Bank, 7 Neb.
59; Hazelton v. Union Bank of Columbus, 32 Wis. 34, 49; Henry v. Northern
Bank of Alabarha, 63 Ala. 527; Cake
v. Pottsville Bank [Sup. Ct. of Penna.],
19 Weekly Notes of Cases 423.
It may be noted before closing that
the preceding cases were controversies between third persons and the
bank. In many cases the president
renders himself personally liable to
the bank by exceeding his authority,
though it may be that his act has
rendered the bank primarily liable
to some third person. Instances of
his liability will be found in Oakland
Savings Bank v. Wilcox, 60 Cal. 126,
where the president allowed overdrafts, and was held liable to the bank
for the loss resulting: First National

Bank of Sturgis v. Beed, 36 Mich.
263, where lie was held personally
liable for money loaned to insolvent
persons; and Citizens' Bank v. IViegand [C. P. of Phila.], 12 Phila. 496,
where he was held liable for the loss
of securities which he had loaned to
a customer for inspection, and it was
not permitted to show that such was
the usual custom of banks. In Hauser V. Tate, 85 N. C. 81, it was
held that the president of a bank is
chargeable with constructive notice of
the management of its affairs by the
cashier and other subordinate officers
and where such bank is doingbusiness without legal organization, he
cannot escape the responsibility resulting from such notice by showing
that he supposed himself the president of a legally constituted bank, if
he has contributed the influence of
his reputation to give undeserved
credit to a spurious corporation.
J. D. Bnowu, Jh.
Philadelphia.

